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F U T U R E S  M A R K E T S , SPE C U L A T IO N  A N D  M O N O P O L Y  P R IC IN G
by
T iziano B R IA N Z A , Louis P H L IP S  
and Jean-François R IC H A R D
Abstract
The possibility for a futures market to exist when the underlying commodity (called 
the cash good) is monopolized has been studied only recently after a long period of neglect, 
possibly due to the implicit assumption that, since futures markets are typically competitive, 
the corresponding cash markets are also competitive.
In the present paper we study a monopoly model of a storable good in a dynamic frame­
work. The influence of the monopolist’s futures position on his intertemporal pricing and 
production policy and the reciprocal influence of the latter on the equilibrium of the futures 
market are analyzed. The possibility of taking a short position increases the monopolist’s 
output and reduces the expected variability of the cash price. Contract curves for futures 
positions are derived under the condition that the monopolist and the speculators have dif­
ferent prior beliefs. Our analysis highlights the essential role played by different prior beliefs ) 
in determining the size of the futures position, the futures price and speculative inventories.
Acknowledgments : We are grateful to Ronald Anderson, Jean-Pierre Danthine and Jacques- 























































































































































































This paper is an attempt to study the influence of futures trading on the monopolist’s 
intertemporal pricing and production plan. A futures contract can be interpreted as a com­
mitment for future actions. Our interest is to analyze the influence that such a commitment 
can have on future and “present” production and prices. Interestingly enough, the existence 
of a futures market modifies the intertemporal discrimination rule due to the influence that 
the financial market exerts on the marginal revenue of the extractor or producer. For the 
case of an exhaustible resource we consequently characterize the effect that futures trading 
has on Hotelling’s rule. Even though our model stresses the role played by speculators, the 
qualitative result about the path of prices would be similar if the hedging component was 
explicitly introduced.
The working of futures markets for monopolized cash goods has been studied only re­
cently after a long period of neglect, possibly due to the irrealistic assumption that, since 
futures markets are perfectly competitive (a most debatable assumption itself), the corre­
sponding cash markets are also perfectly competitive. Casual observation shows that cash 
markets are often dominated by a few large producers who can and do manipulate the fu­
tures market (see the papers in Anderson (1984) and Anderson and Gilbert (1986)). Three 
papers are of particular interest. Newbery (1984) compares the competitive equilibrium of 
a futures market for a nonstorable commodity with the equilibrium that arises when there 
is a risk-neutral dominant producer, facing a risk-averse competitive fringe, who acts as a 
big speculator. Any departure from the competitive futures price is interpreted as market 
manipulation by the dominant producer. Futures markets are seen as reducing risk for the 
competitive fringe, by providing the opportunity to hedge. The existence of futures markets 
therefore induces a supply increase of the cash good. The big speculator counteracts this 
by reducing the bias between the cash and the futures price. The reduction of fringe supply 
increases the expected cash price and thereby increases the expected profits of the dominant 
producer on the cash market. Newbery (1987) refines this analysis by allowing the dominant 
producer also to be risk-averse and discusses the conditions under which this producer may 
wish to suppress the futures market. Anderson and Sundaresan (1984) present a static anal­
ysis of a monopolist who can trade in futures at time 1 and produces a perishable good at 
time 2, the maturity date. They also find that futures trading increases supply. However, 
here it is the monopolist who produces more (at time 2) if it has sold futures (at time 1). 
Again, hedging is essential : futures trading is possible only if the futures market is viewed 
by the monopolist as a hedging instrument. No trade takes place if the futures market is 
purely speculative in a rational expectations equilibrium.




























































































good is more or less monopolized. It seems worthwhile, therefore, to investigate whether 
another approach could account for this observation and to derive a purely speculative equi­
librium under monopoly or oligopoly. In this paper we concentrate on the monopoly case in 
order to come to grips with the problem. We depart from the Newbery approach by excluding 
hedging and abandoning the competitive equilibrium as a standard of reference. Instead, we 
define manipulation in terms of the power a monopolist has to determine not only the current 
cash price but also the cash price to prevail in the future (to an extent determined by the 
(degree of uncertainty about market demand). We depart from the Anderson-Sundaresan ap­
proach , not only because we need a dynamic model to account for this sort of manipulation, 
but also because we abandon the standard capital asset pricing model with its combined as­
sumption of rational expectations and identical prior beliefs. Theses assumptions seem rather 
unrealistic and inappropriate, especially for a speculative market in which some traders have 
market power. Futures positions will be derived with the help of contract curves based on 
different priors. Differences in opinion will thus play a central role, as in the approach advo­
cated by Varian (1987). As for the futures prices, these will be determined using bargaining 
theory.
In order to work out the monopolist’s intertemporal pricing and production (or extrac­
tion) plan, we need a dynamic model with at least two periods during which the commodity 
can be produced (or extracted). This in turn allows for the possibility that the commodity 
may be stored by the monopolist (or by nature).
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. In a first step, the monopolist determines the time 
path of the production rate, the sales rate and the cash price, given its futures position 
and the current futures price. It is shown how the futures position affects the current cash 
price and the cash price planned at the maturity date. In a second step, the possibility for 
a purely speculative market to exist is examined. We find that contract curves can exist 
when the monopolist’s expectations about market demand differ sufficiently from those of 
the speculators. Speculative futures positions and the futures price can then be determined 
under certain realistic informational assumptions.
Section I starts with the simpler case where a natural resource is monopolized. The 
possibility of taking a futures position is seen to affect Hotelling’s rule. Section 1.2 develops 
the full model of a reproducible and storable commodity. The results are illustrated with 
the help of quadratic specifications. Section II then examines the expected profits that can 
be earned on the futures market, given that the monopolist is on its optimal extraction or 




























































































market is purely speculative. Section III shows under what conditions speculative stocks of 
the natural resource can be carried in the framework of our model.
I. T H E C A SH  M A R K E T
1.1. T he case of an E xhaustib le  R esource
Suppose a natural resource is monopolized. Before the production decisions are made, 
there is a futures market for this cash good on which the monopolist can enter a futures 
position /  at the futures price p ' . In period 2, the futures price is equal to the cash price 
j>2, determined by the monopolist, since i =  2 is the maturity date. The monopolist faces an 
instantaneous demand curve pi =  p-, (qt), where q, is the rate of extraction and pi is the cash 
price net of a constant cost of extraction (1 =  1,2). Nature has provided an initial stock s0 
to be sold over the two periods or
*o =  g i+  92- (1)
Any quantity extracted is immediately consumed. In particular, there are no speculative 
stocks carried from period 1 to period 2.
In period 1 the monopolist maximizes the profit function
)  M 92) 92 -  /j>2(92)] +J>i(9i) -9i +  fp 1, (2)
with respect to qi and 52, subject to constraint (1). The real rate of interest is represented 
by r. j>1 and /  are supposed to be predetermined. Their determination is the subject of 
Section II. A short position implies /  > 0; a long position implies /  < 0. Maximization of 
the Lagrangian gives
+ i(9 i) +  9i <fri(9i)dq1 ^ 2(92) +  92
<(P2(92) _  y *2(92)] _
J92 <*92 J
=  A (3)
together with (1). This is a modified Hotelling rule. Instead of equalizing discounted marginal 
revenues over time, the monopolist must correct the second period’s marginal revenue to take 
his futures position into account.
How this affects the extraction and pricing policy can be illustrated with an algebraic 






























































































91 -  o/o ■ _ \(a r  +  2*o -  / )
-ar  +  2(1 +  r)s0 +  /]•
2(2 +  r ) v 
1
92 = 2(2 +  r) 1
(4)
If the monopolist has taken a short position ( /  > 0), it will plan to extract more in period 
2 and less in period 1 than if it had no futures position. With r =  0, this difference is equal 
to / /4 .  Clearly, the purpose is to decrease p2 below and to increase p\ above the level they 
would take in the absence of a futures market. Indeed, the cash prices are
i’1 = 2/3(21+ r ) [(4 +  r)a _2 S 0  +  /]
P2 =2/3(2+ ; ] [(4+ 3 r)“  ■ 2 (1+ r ) '°  - / ] -
With r =  0, the reduction in the price variation Ap = p 2 ~ pi is equal to —//2/3 or 
\ f  dp2(q2 ) l i l 2 - The larger is r, the smaller is this reduction. The same is true for /3.
In what follows, we put r =  0 to simplify the presentation and to facilitate the interpre­
tation. Under that assumption, the optimal plan is
- /
91 =  9 -  ^
P i - P  +  ^ f
92 =  9 +  4 





where q =  so/2  is the quantity extracted (in both periods) in the absence of a futures market, 
p — ocj13 — so/2/3 is the cash price (in both periods) in the absence of a futures market and 
ft =  1/4/3 > 0.




























































































We now generalize the preceding model by allowing for the possibility that the cash good 
is produced at a rate xt and reinterpreting q̂  as the rate at which it is sold and p, as the 
cash price. The monopolist has a strictly convex cost of production K(xt ) and a strictly 
convex cost of storage C(s(), where s, is his inventory level at the end of period i. C(s() has 
a minimum at s > 0. The initial and terminal inventory level is s, so that
»! =  s +  X! -  qx
*2 =  »i +  x2 -  92 =  *• (6)
Neither the buyers of the cash good nor the speculators carry any inventory, so that there is 
no resale trading.
The monopolist maximizes the Lagrangian
Pi(gi)gi +  1*2(92)92 -  -K(*i) -  K(x2) -  C(s +  art -  5i) 
+ ]p! -  J>2(g2)]/ -A (gi +  3 2 -^ 1  ~ x 2)
with respect to qi,q2)x i ,x 2 and A. The first-order conditions are
/. \ i dP i(9i) , * 7(»i) „ v . /. ,x dP2(92)pi (gi )  +  q 1 — — I— j ——  — f> 2 (? 2 )  +  (q2 -  / ) —j  - -  — A
dK(Xl) | rfC(«,) _  JK(x2) _  A 
dx1 ds 1 dx2





With /  nonzero, marginal revenue differs from marginal production cost by the quantity 
f dP2(<î2)/<7î 2 at period 2. Equation (9) is the well-known condition - see Phlips and Thisse 
(1981) - that the rate of production is governed by the equality of the marginal cost of storage 
and the change in the marginal cost of production. According to equation (8), the rate of sales 
must be such that the marginal cost of storage is equal to the change in marginal revenue, 
corrected for —fdp2(q2)/dq2. And the price change Ap =  p2 —p 1 is
Ap =
dC
dsi A (pi/) +  /
<7p2
<*92’ (H)
so that o short position ( /  > 0) is seen to reduce the variation of the cash price. (The 
converse is true if the monopolist takes a long position), q designates the elasticity of the 
instantaneous demand function for the cash good. Since A (pq) is positive when p is rising, 




























































































The working of the model is again better understood if we specify the demand, cost of 
production and cost of storage functions. (These specifications will be used in Section II 
below). Let the instantaneous demand function be a//) — (1/P)qi, the same in both periods. 
Specify K(xi)  as
K(xi) =  kxt +  lx 7
with k , l  >  0, and let C'(jj) be
C(»*) = j  +  msi +  r»»2
with m < 0,n , j  > 0 and * defined by C'(s,) =  0 or s =  - m /ln  > 0. The negative slope 
coefficient reflects the “convenience yield” (see Brennan (1958)) so that s can be interpreted 
as a buffer stock held to satisfy unexpected orders.
Conditions (7) to (11) then have the following solution :
91 -  9Î (12.1)
Xl + ( 12.2)
92 — 92 +




7 =  t  +  » (1  +  f i t)
9 =  S ( l+ f t t )
8 =  U +  2n(l + pi)
and ql — =  x\ =  x % =  (a — Pk)/2(1 +  pi)  is the quantity produced and sold in the two
periods in the absence of a futures market. All coefficients are positive, except m.
When the monopolist takes a short position ( /  > 0) in period 1, both and x2 are 
larger than in the absence of a futures market : total production is increased, and so are total 
sales (since x\ +  x2 =  qi +  q2)- However, there is a shift of sales from the first to the second 




























































































II . T H E F U T U R E S  M A R K E T
Suppose that a futures market is set up for the cash good and offers a contract (p^, / )  to 
a risk-neutral monopolist and a risk-neutral representative speculator. (Market equilibrium 
requires that the speculators together take a position that matches the position taken by the 
monopolist.) Under what conditions will both sides accept such a contract ?
Under rational expectations such a contract is not possible. The No Trade theorem by 
Kreps (1977) and Tirole (1982) shows that risk-averse traders do not trade and that risk- 
neutral traders cannot expect any gain from trade : “speculation relies on inconsistent plans 
and is ruled out by rational expectations” (Tirole, 1982, p. 1163). In addition, the No Trade 
theorem by Milgrom and Stokey (1982), known as the Groucho Marx theorem, shows that 
private information cannot create an incentive to trade in the absence of an insurance motive 
for trading because “the mere willingness of the other traders to accept their parts of the bet 
is evidence to at least one trader that his own part is unfavorable. Hence no trade can be 
found that is acceptable to all traders. This no-trade result depends crucially on the rational 
expectations assumption that it is common knowledge when a trade is carried out that the 
trade is feasible and that it is mutually acceptable to all of the participants” (Milgrom and 
Stokey, 1982, p. 18).
To get around the Kreps-Tirole theorem, we shall depart from the Bayesian assump­
tion that priors are identical. (Alternative routes are to introduce a non-rational trader or 
hedging). To get around the Milgrom-Stokey theorem, we shall suppose that, although the 
contract curve and the underlying beliefs are common knowledge, the traders do not make 
full use of this information. Differences in prior beliefs are thus not based on private infor­
mation but on differences in “opinion” , in the terminology of Varian (1987). Such differences 
in opinion result from the fact that a trader inteprets the beliefs of other traders as being 
noncredible and refuses to update his beliefs.
The information structure is then as follows. The monopolist’s production and inventory 
technology and the form of the demand function for the cash good are common knowledge. 
Both the monopolist and the speculator are uncertain about the level of demand (a) for the 
cash good in periods 1 and 2 and have different expectations about its potential realizations. 
The monopolist determines its futures position before any production or sales decision is 
taken. If the speculator takes the matching (opposite) futures position, the monopolist can 
infer from this that the speculator’s demand expectation is different from his. The speculator 




























































































expectation is (by observing the period 1 price set by the monopolist for the cash good). 
Both are convinced, therefore, that the other party errs. Having discovered the true value of 
a, the monopolist revises the cash price in period 2 (given the observed qi). Ex post, p2 is 
thus different from what both parties expected it to be when they accepted contract (p* , f )  
and their realized profits are different from what they expected.
The risk-neutral speculator is active on the futures market only and maximizes the 
expected value of
<t> =  t>2(?2) (13)
This speculator buys f  (takes a long position /  > 0) if the expected cash price Ep2 > .
However, this expected price depends on the monopolist’s optimal production and sales policy 
for the cash good. And the futures position /  is non zero and finite to the extent that the 
monopolist accepts only a finite matching position.
The monopolist maximizes its expected gain on the futures market, given the first- 
order conditions on the cash market and subject to the condition that the speculator’s gain 
is nonnegative. This problem can be handled using the dynamic programming solutions 
worked out above for the cash market, if the quadratic specifications are accepted as valid 
approximations. Indeed, the certainty equivalence principle - see Simon (1956) - allows us to 
reinterpret the first-order conditions as maximizing the monopolist’s expected profit. Being 
risk-neutral, the monopolist acts as a speculator on the futures market.
The argument to be developed in this section can be summarized as follows. Substitution 
of the optimal values for the cash market into the monopolist’s intertemporal profit function 
makes it possible to separate the monopolist’s expected gain in the absence of a futures 
position from the expected gain on the futures market. Adding up the speculator’s and the 
monopolist’s expected profits on the futures market, their sum turns out not to be zero. If 
they both had the same demand expectations, then this sum would be negative and no trade 
in futures would be possible. However, when the demand expectations are different, then the 
sum of their expected profits on the futures market can le positive. There exist contract curves 
and contracts (p^, f )  located on them are accepted ly both parties.
Let us examine this more closely, first in the case of an exhaustible resource and then in 




























































































2.1. T he Case of an E xhaustib le R esource
Take the exhaustible resource model as specified in Section 1.1 and suppose a  is a 
random variable whose realization is uncertain. All other coefficients are fixed and common 
knowledge. The specifications used are also common knowledge. Insert the equilibrium values 
of Equations (5) into the monopolist’s profit function (2), with r =  0. The result is
n „  =  p»o + (p1 - p ) f  +  ^ / 2. (14)
The expected profit in the absence of a futures position isp»o, the expected market value 
of the stock (net of extraction costs), since p is a function of the expected value of a. The 
monopolist’s expected gain due to the futures position is
'A =  <J>f - p ) f  +  (15)
If the speculator has the same expectation about a, his expected gain is
•A =  (p ~ p ‘ )f  -  f* /2 (16)
since he would use the same expected value of p 2 (as given in Equation (5.4)) to evaluate 
<j>. Clearly the futures market is a zero-sum game and risk-neutral agents would take any 
position.1 Nevertheless in this model the equilibrium futures quantity is zero because the 
action taken on the futures market influences the monopolist’s profit on the cash market. By 
entering a futures position different from zero the monopolist deviates from the optimal cash 
quantities and therefore the profit is reduced. For our linear example the loss is equal to 
p / 2/ 2. If no profit is realized on the futures market, the monopolist does not trade futures 
contracts. Stated differently: the sum tp +  <p =  - p / 2/2  is negative and there can be no trade 
in futures.2
Indeed, the monopolist takes a futures position only if ^  > 0. tp =  0 for }  — 0 or for 
p i — p — 4[f. On the other hand, xp > 0 for p i =  p + y- — f / ,  a rectangular hyperbola in the 
( p i , / )  plane. The speculator wants <p >  0. ^  =  0 for /  =  0 or for p i — p  — pf,  while <p > 0 
for p i = p  — y  — pf.  The situation is as depicted in Figure 1. The only value on which they 
can agree is /  =  0.
'I t  is important to note the distinction between the profit realized on the futures market and 
the profit derived from futures transactions. For the speculator both are identical because he 
is only active on the futures market. The monopolist is also active on the cash market and 
equation (15) combines the direct and the indirect consequences of futures trading.































































































Figure 1. Same exp ectations
The situation is very different when expectations about a  differ. Suppose the monopolist 
expects oi to be otm while the speculator expects a  to be a ,. The monopolist’s (certainty 
equivalent) plans are then given by Equations (5.1) - (5.4) where p is replaced by
Pm =  -  i » 0).
Hence the monopolist’s expected gain due to futures trading is
=  (p‘ ~Pm)f  +  f / J- (17)
The speculator expects instead p to be
p, =  4p(a, -  i * 0)
so that his expected gain is
<P, = ( p , - p ' ) f - p f 2- (18)
We note that
'Pm + <t>, =  (JP, ~Pm)f -  ^ / J =  -  <*m)f ~  (19)
so that trade in futures can take place if c*s ^  am. Two cases are to be distinguished 




























































































If the speculator is more optimistic than the monopolist about demand (a , > a m), then 
a contract is possible only for /  > 0. 4>m =  0 for — Pm — \ f  and <j>s =  0 for pf — p s — p f  
and these straight lines intersect for /  =  2(ps — pm)/p  =  8(c*s — <*„,) > 0 (see Figure 2). 
Trade in futures can take place inside the triangle area.
f
P
Figure 2. T he specu lator is m ore optim istic
In order to find the equilibrium values of /  and pf we maximize the monopolist’s profit 
function for futures subject to the condition that <j> — </>o > 0 or the Lagrangian
L = (p> - p m)f  +  ^ / 2 +  A[(p, - p ! ) }  -  p f 2 -  <t>0] (20)
with respect to /  and p^ .
We find
or f  — while
If instead the monopolist is more optimistic than the speculator (<*„ > or,), then a 
contract is possible only for /  < 0 (the monopolist takes a long position, that is, buys
/  =  (p> ~ Pm)/P =  4(<*s -  <*„) ( 21)






























































































futures). The straight lines p i  =  pm — fj-f  and p i =  p, — p f  intersect for /  =  8(as — a„)  < 0 
(see Figure 3) and trade in futures can take place inside the triangle area. The equilibrium 
value is given by /  =  i / .
f
P
F igure 3. T he m onopolist is m ore optim istic
The reader may wonder how a monopolist could possibly take a long position, which 
calls for delivery in period 2 by the speculators (who then are short). In fact, this objection 
is not valid. Two interpretations are possible (see Anderson and Sundaresan (1984), p. 77 
and note 4). One can imagine that all futures positions can be closed out in period 2, the 
difference between p i  and the realized being paid out to the party with the better forecast. 
It is also conceivable that the futures market does not call for delivery at all but only for a 
cash settlement in period 2. (Some existing stock market index futures illustrate this second 
interpretation).
The monopolist’s (short or long) equilibrium position /  is independent of p i  and appears 
therefore as a vertical line segment in Figures 2 and 3. The equilibrium price p i  corresponding 
to /  is anywhere on the vertical segments. It is in the monopolist’s interest that p i  be as 
close as possible to pm (the profit maximizing second period cash price in the absence of a 
futures market), that is, as high as possible when the speculator is more optimistic (Figure 




























































































Since the speculator has the opposite interest, a bargaining situation arises with respect 
to the futures price. A unique price can be determined if one is ready to accept one of the 
available bargaining solutions. We suggest the Nash bargaining point.3
The Nash solution implies the maximization of the product of \j>m and <j>, with respect 
to p i  or
H m  1 d<j>,
dpi *' dpi ^  -  ° ‘
Since 9\i>mjdpl  =  d<j>s/d p l , this boils down to solving <j>, — <pm for pi  so that
P1 =  K j j m  _  (22)
On the other hand, since xj>m — 4>, at equilibrium, it suffices to maximize
with respect to /  to find the equilibrium futures position
J — (p« ~ P™)





— Pm "b ^(Pm Pi))
(23)
a point on the vertical segments in Figures 2 and 3. The futures price is the lower with respect 
to the fifty-fifty point, the larger is the dispersion in opinion when the speculators are more 
optimistic than the monopolist. This solution can be interpreted as the perfect equilibrium 
of a two-stage game in which the quantities (the futures positions) are determined in the first 
stage and the prices in the second stage.
The same result can be obtained using a non-cooperative bargaining solution similar to 
Rubinstein’s paradigm.4 In our model, the expected profit is function of the futures quantities 
only. The futures price determine the proportion (of profit) that each participant receives
3We are grateful to Yves Richelle for working out this solution for us.




























































































if an agreement is achieved. Assume an artificial institution where the agents take turns to 
make a price proposal: at some fictious time 0 the first player proposes a price. Immidiately 
after, player two accepts or makes a new proposal to which player one reacts and so on. The 
payoff will be the share of profit received multiplied by a discount factor less than one (we 
assume that the discount factor is the same for both players).5 It has been shown that if 
the time delay between proposals tends to zero then the partition is 1/2. In our model the 
maximum expected “profit” for the monopolist is obtained when pf — pm and is equal to 
xjim =  (p, —pm)2/ 2. The speculator realizes the same expected profit whenp-^ =  (3pm — p ,) /2. 
What we need to compute is the level of p^ such that the monopolist and the speculator receive 
1/2 of the payoff. This value is:
■ Pm T
(Pm ~ Ps)
which gives the same result as for the previous bargaining concept.
2.2. T he Case of a R eproducib le and Storable C om m odity
Using the fact that s =  —m/2n, the equilibrium values (12) of the model with a repro­
ducible and storable commodity imply the equilibrium prices
2/2
P \ = p '  +  ~ f f  (24.1)
P2 = P *
where p* =  (2aj3i +  a +  /?fc)/2/3(l +  fit). 
profit function gives
y  + 1 + pt-2
P» (24.2)
Insertion of this value of pz into the speculator’s
<t> =  {p' ~ p ' ) f  ~ vf 2 (25)
where v =  (Ptn +  U  +  n +  /3f2)/5/3(l +  fit). Insertion of Equations (12) and (24) into the 
monopolist’s profit function gives
n ra =  n .  +  ( p / - p * ) /  +  ^ / 2, (26)
where II4 is his profit in the absence of a futures market. These results are of the same form 
as those obtained for the case of an exhaustible resource (compare with (14) - (16)). As a 
result the analysis carried out in the previous section applies to the present case without 
modification.




























































































III . SPE C U L A T IV E  IN V E N T O R IE S
3.1. Specu lative Inventories: The cash m arket
In this section we analyze the model of exhaustible resources presented previously with 
the additional assumption that the speculator has the possibility of holding inventories for 
speculative motives. Alternatively, we could introduce a new type of agent, a so-called trader, 
the activity of whom would be to trade the good on the cash market exclusively. We continue 
to assume that the interest rate r — 0. All agents may have different expectations about the 
level of demand ai in period two. These expectations are denoted by arj,;, where t is the index 
referring to the monopolist (» =  m) or to the speculator (» =  s). In period one the level of 
demand is known and is equal to ori.
The profit function for the speculator holding speculative stocks as well as futures posi­
tions is
c(x) is the cost of carrying the stock from period one to period two. We assume that this 
cost function is quadratic and can be specified as
This decision is made in period one simultaneously with the decision of extraction made by 
the monopolist.
*
The monopolist sells qi in period one to consumers that again do not participate in the 
futures market and to the speculator. The aggregate demand function obtained from the 
consumers’ maximization of their utility function for period i =  1,2 is:
n s =  (p2,, -.P i)*  -  c(x) +  (p2,, - p ! )f (27)
where Jo > * > 0 represents the amount bought in period one, stored and sold in period two.
<*) =  I * 2 , c'(x) -  yx




9i,c =  9i - *  =  “ l - f o i -




























































































In period two the monopolist sells »o — 91 =  *o — 9i,c — * =  92- The consumers buy q? from 
the monopolist and x from the speculator.
The expected inverse demand function is6
«2 1 , . ,
p> =  j - ^ ( 9 2  +  *)
The monopolist solves the following program
m axll™ =  J>i(9i) T Pi,m (92) +  ( f / ~  P2,m (92))/
91.91
s.t. 91 +  92 =  *0





For positive speculative stock and a given futures position, the value of pi is higher and 
P2 is lower if compared to a situation without speculation on the cash market. Speculation 
can therefore have a stabilizing impact on prices. This effect has the same type of impact as 
a short futures position entered by the monopolist. Consequently the presence of an active 
speculator (or trader) on the cash market and on the futures market (long position) might 
reinforce the overall stabilizing effect. A complete analysis of the question will be pursued 
after the equilibrium on the futures market is described.
We assume that the expectations held by the individuals are common knowledge. There­
fore when the speculator determines his optimal stock he knows the monopolist’s expected 
level of demand for period two and as a consequence knows that 52 is a function of <*2,m • His 
expected inverse demand function is
P ?,> =  ~ p i l l  +  x ) (30)
6To simplify the notation we omit the symbol E for the expectation’s operator.
<* 1 -  <*2.m x fII
+ T  + 2 4
«2,m -  <*1 +  ’° x +  fqi  4 +  2
3<*1 +  ar2,™ *0 . x f
P l ~  4 p 2/3 2 / 3 4 / 3
3c*2,m +  “ 1 *0 x }




























































































where g2 is the monopolist’s optimal value (given x, / ) .  Substituting q2 we obtain
_  4<*2,8 -  Of2,m +  <*1 _  ____f_
P 2,1 ~  4p  2/3 2p  4P
and the optimal speculative stock can be expressed as
2&2 ,s &2,m &1 f
2(1 +  70)
(31)
(32)
The futures position that appears in x is the position entered by the monopolist. Even if 
expectations are the same for the two agents and identical to <*1, x can be positive for a given 
long futures position. This is not surprising if we consider the extraction model previously 
presented. With static demand we found that when the monopolist entered a short position 
the prices declined. This decline would have prevented any speculation on the cash market. 
Inversely for a long futures position the prices increased and hence speculative stocks could 
have existed. With demand shifting upward across time, stocks might be carried even with a 
short futures position. In other words, the speculator may hold inventories and simultaneously 
go long, that is, buy futures.
We also find
„ ,  . * ( /)  /  
91 -  91 +  1  4 (33.1)
9 2 - Î 2 - —  + 4 (33.2)
„ _  " 1 * (/)  , /
P l ~ Pl +  W  + w
(33.3)
3̂ *o 3 II 3 1 1 (33.4)
where q 1 =  (<*1 — ct2,ra)/4  +  so/2, 52 — (<*2,m — <*i)/4 +  *o/2 are the quantities extracted 
in the absence of futures and speculative stocks, p\  =  (3<*i +  <*2,m)/4/9 — so/2/?, P2,m — 
(3*1*2,m +  <*i)/4/3 — »o/2P are the cash prices in period one and the cash price expected by 
the monopolist in period two in the absence of futures and speculative stock, x(f)  is the 
speculative stock conditional on a futures position / .  According to the speculator’s beliefs, 
the second period expected price can be rewritten as
■P2,» (34)




























































































3.2. T he Futures M arket E quilibrium
Inserting the equilibrium values of the previous subsection into the monopolist’s profit 
function we obtain
n „  =Pi9i + F 2,™?2 +  (P2,m - P i ) ( ^ ---- 7 y )  +  (9i _  9 2 ) (^ j----2^ ) —
/ 2 , x ( / ) 2 , r f . . * ( / ) .  / , .
8̂  +  “ 2T  +  [p “ i,2'”’ + l ^  +  i ^ ]/
The speculator’s profit function becomes
n * -  [P2„ - h ~ Y p -  ^ W / )  -  J r* (/)2 + Pa,.- T t - ^ i r  - A f4/3 2/3
In order to find the equilibrium values for /  and jX we solve the following program
max 4? s.t. $  >
where W is the expected gain from futures transactions:7
*  =(P2,„ -F i)({  -  y p )  +  (?l - K /X  / 2 , * ( / ) 2 .2/3 '  8/3 2/3
[p/ _ i2 '™ + ^  +  4/3] / ’
This will enable us to write IIm in term of the cash variable and the futures variable separately. 
(To lessen the complexity of the expression we did not decompose x(f)  into the cash and 
futures component.) $  represents the profit for the speculator. The equilibrium futures 
position is
/ = ( “ 2. , -<*2,m ) ( ^  +  4) (35)
Depending on the expectations formulated by the monopolist and the speculator, the resulting 
equilibrium (in terms of the monopolist’s position) corresponds to a long or a short futures 
position. Interestingly, the value of /  is equal to its value in the model without speculative 
stocks when 7 tends to infinity:
lim /  =  4(a2,s7—*00
Up to now, the analysis did not explicitly incorporate the fact that the optimal value 
of x  must be positive. Given the equilibrium on the futures market, we must determine the
7The correct expected gain from futures transaction requires to break down x ( /)  into two 




























































































condition on the parameters ai,a^,i such that the constraint x > 0 is not violated. Using 
the equilibrium value of /  in x we have
2(1 +  70)
1
(«2,» -  <*l) - 7/32(1 + 70)
2 +  3-r/?
^ (“ 2,. -  <*2,m)- (36)
x > 0 if
(37)
When both agents expect an increase of the demand level and the speculator is more optimistic 
it is possible under condition (37) to have an equilibrium on the futures market with positive 
speculative stocks. If the monopolist is more optimistic, then the equilibrium futures quantity 
will correspond to a long position (for the monopolist) and the speculative stocks will be 
positive. The futures quantities exchanged are larger when compared to the case without 
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